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Abstract
This is a tutorial presentation of the auction algorithm, an intuitive method for solving the classical
assignment problem. The algorithm outperforms substantially its main competitors for important types of
problems, both in theory and in practice, and is also naturally well suited for parallel computation. We derive
the algorithm from first principles, we explain its computational properties, and we discuss its extensions to
transportation and transhipment problems.
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1. The Assignment Problem
1. THE ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM
In the classical assignment problem there are n persons and n objects that we have to match on
a one-to-one basis. There is a benefit aij for matching person i with object j and we want to assign
persons to objects so as to maximize the total benefit. Mathematically, we want to find a one-to-one
assignment (a set of person-object pairs (1,jl),... ,(n, jn), such that the objects jl1,.. , j are all
distinct), which is such that the corresponding total benefit i=l aij, is maximal.
The assignment problem is important in many practical contexts. The most obvious ones are
resource allocation problems such as assigning personnel to jobs, machines to tasks, and the like.
There are also situations where the assignment problem appears as a subproblem in various methods
for solving more complex problems; for example, in an important method for solving traveling
salesman problems [HeK70], [HeK71].
The assignment problem is also of great theoretical importance because, despite its simplicity, it
embodies a fundamental linear programming structure. It can be shown that what is perhaps the
most important class of linear programming problems, linear network flow problems, can be reduced
to the assignment problem by means of a simple reformulation (see [BeT89], p. 335, or [PaS82], p.
149). Thus, any method for solving the assignment problem can be generalized to solve the linear
network flow problem. For this reason, the assignment problem has served as a convenient starting
point for important algorithmic ideas in linear programming. For example, the primal-dual method
[FoF62], [Min60O], was motivated and developed through Kuhn's Hungarian method [Kuh55], the first
specialized method for the assignment problem. (The name of the algorithm honors its connection
with the work of the Hungarian mathematician Egervary, dating to 1931.)
There has also been a plethora of algorithms for the assignment problem in the thirty five years
since Kuhn's original proposal; for a representative but incomplete sample, see [Ba185], [Bal86],
[BGK77], [Ber81], [CMT88], [Der85], [Eng82], [GGK82], [Gol85], [Hal56], [Hun83], [JoV87], [McG83],
[Mun56], and [Tho81]. All of these methods are based on iterative improvement of some cost function;
for example a primal cost (as in primal simplex methods), or a dual cost (as in Hungarian-like
methods, in dual simplex methods, and in relaxation methods).
The auction algorithm, first proposed by the author in [Ber79] and further discussed recently
in [Ber85], [Ber88], represents a significant departure from the cost improvement idea; at any one
iteration, it may deteriorate both the primal and the dual cost, although in the end it finds an optimal
assignment. It is based on a notion of approximate optimality, called c-complementary slackness, and
while it implicitly tries to solve a dual problem, it actually attains a dual solution which is not quite
optimal. The auction algorithm was originally conceived as a method for masssively parallel solution
of the assignment problem, but it has also turned out to be very effective for serial computation.
Our intent in this paper is to provide an intuitive understanding of the auction algorithm. To
this end, we introduce an economic equilibrium problem that turns out to be equivalent to the
assignment problem as we proceed to explain.
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2. PRICES AND EQUILIBRIA
Let us consider the possibility of matching the n objects with the n persons through a market
mechanism, viewing each person as an economic agent acting in his own best interest. Suppose that
object j has a price pj and that the person who receives the object must pay the price pj. Then, the
(net) value of object j for person i is aij - pj and each person i would logically want to be assigned
to an object ji with maximal value, that is, with
aiji--pji = max {aij-pj}. (1)j=1 ,...,n
We will say that a person i is happy if this condition holds and we will say that an assignment and
a set of prices are at equilibrium when all persons are happy.
Equilibrium assignments and prices are naturally of great interest to economists, but there is also
a fundamental relation with the assignment problem; it turns out that an equilibrium assignment
offers maximum total benefit (and thus solves the assignment problem), while the corresponding set
of prices solves an associated dual optimization problem. This is a consequence of the celebrated
duality theorem of linear programming (see e.g. [Dan63], [PaS82]; in the terminology of linear pro-
gramming, the "happiness" relation (1) is known as complementary slackness). We provide a simple,
first principles, proof of the relation of equilibria to optimal assignments and dual optimization in
Appendix A, but for simplicity, we will not emphasize linear programming and duality in this paper.
3. AN AUCTION PROCESS
Let us consider now a natural process for finding an equilibrium assignment. We will call this pro-
cess the naive auction algorithm, because we will soon discover that it has a serious flaw. Nonetheless,
this flaw will help motivate a more sophisticated and correct algorithm.
The naive auction algorithm proceeds in "rounds" (or "iterations") starting with any assignment
and any set of prices. There is an assignment and a set of prices at the beginning of each round,
and if all persons are happy with these, the process terminates. Otherwise some person who is not
happy is selected. This person, call him i, finds an object ji which offers maximal value, that is,
Ji = arg max {aij- pj, (2)
and then:
(a) Exchanges objects with the person assigned to ji at the beginning of the round.
(b) Sets the price of the best object ji to the level at which he is indifferent between ji and the
second best object, that is, he sets pji to
Pi, + 7i, (3)
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where
V- = vi - - (4)
vP is the best object value,
vi = max{aij - pj), (5)
and wi is the second best object value
wi = max {ai - p , (6)
that is, the best value over objects other than ji. (Note that Yi is the largest increment
by which the best object price pji can be increased, with ji still being the best object for
person i.)
This process is repeated in a sequence of rounds until all persons are happy.
We may view this process as an auction, where at each round the bidder i raises the price of his
preferred object by the bidding increment yi. Note that yi cannot be negative since vi > wi [cf. Eqs.
(5) and (6)], so the object prices tend to increase. The choice yi is illustrated in Fig. 1. Just as in a
real auction, bidding increments and price increases spur competition by making the bidder's own
preferred object less attractive to other potential bidders.
-v 1i-. - - vi : The value of j i, the best object for person i
/- i)- - ------ I -w· The value of the second best object for person i
Values a.. - p.
of objectsjl j Bidding increment Y7i of person i for its best
for person i object j
Figure 1: Bidding increment -yi in the naive auction algorithm. Even after the price of ji is increased by
this amount, ji continues to be the preferred object, so the bidder i is happy following the round. Note that we
have yi = 0 if there are two objects most preferred by the bidder i.
Does this auction process work? Unfortunately, not always. The difficulty is that the bidding
increment 7i is zero when there are more than one objects offering maximum value for the bidder i.
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PERSONS OBJECTS
Initially assigned " 1 Initial price = 0
to object 1
Initially assigne 2 Initialprice = 0
to object 2
Here aij = C > O for all (i,j) with i = 1,2,3 and j = 1,2
and aijj = 0 for all (i,j) with i- 1,2,3 and j = 3
Initially assigned Initial price - O
to object 3
At Start Bidder Preferred Biddingof Round Object Prices Assigned Pairs Happy Bidder P referredPersons Object Increment
1 0, 0, 0 (1,1) (2,2) (3,3) 1,2 3 2 0
2 0, 0, 0 (1,1) (2,3) (3,2) 1, 3 2 2 0
3 0, 0, 0 (1,1) (2,2) (3,3) 1, 2 3 2 0
Figure 2: Illustration of how the naive auction algorithm may never terminate for a three person and three
object problem. Here objects 1 and 2 offer benefit C > 0 to all persons, and object 3 offers benefit 0 to all
persons. The algorithm cycles as persons 2 and 3 alternately bid for object 2 without changing its price because
they prefer equally object 1 and object 2 ('yi = 0, cf. Fig. 1).
As a result, a situation may be created where several persons contest a smaller number of equally
desirable objects without raising their prices, thereby creating a never ending cycle; see Fig. 2.
To break such cycles, we introduce a perturbation mechanism, motivated by real auctions where
each bid for an object must raise its price by a minimum positive increment, and bidders must on
occassion take risks to win their preferred objects. In particular, let us fix a positive scalar e and
say that a person i is almost happy with an assignment and a set of prices if the value of its assigned
object ji is within c of being maximal, that is,
aij,i -pj, > max aij - pj} - . (7)
We will say that an assignment and a set of prices are almost at equilibrium when all persons are
almost happy. The condition (7), introduced first in 1979 in conjunction with the auction algorithm,
is known as e-complementary slackness and has played a central role in several algorithmic contexts
recently (see e.g. [Ber86a], [BeC89b], [BeE88], [GaT87], and [GoT87]). For c = 0 it reduces to
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ordinary complementary slackness [cf. Eq. (1)].
We now reformulate the previous auction process so that the bidding increment is always at least
equal to c. The resulting method, which we henceforth call the auction algorithm, is the same as
the naive auction algorithm, except that the bidding increment -yi is
Yi = Vi- Wi + c, (8)
[rather than -7 = vi - wi as in Eq. (4)]. With this choice, the bidder of a round is almost happy
at the end of the round (rather than happy), as illustrated in Fig. 3. The particular increment
yi = vi - wi + c used in the auction algorithm is the maximum amount with this property. Smaller
increments yi would also work as long as yi > c, but using the largest possible increment accelerates
the algorithm. This is consistent with experience from real auctions, which tend to terminate faster
when the bidding is aggressive.
- - -v. :The value of ji, the best object for person i
-w ----- - - :The value of the second best object for person i
Values a..-p. i
' of objects 'j Bidding increment Yi of person i for its bestfor person i
object ji.
Figure 3: Illustration of the bidding increment 7i in the auction algorithm. Even after the price of the preferred
object ji is increased by this amount, ji will be within e from being most preferred, so the bidder i is almost
happy following the round.
We can now show that this reformulated auction process terminates in a finite number of rounds,
necessarily with an assignment and a set of prices which are almost at equilibrium. To see this, we
note that once an object receives a bid for the first time, then the person assigned to the object
at every subsequent round is almost happy; the reason is that a person is almost happy just after
acquiring an object through a bid, and continues to be almost happy as long as he holds the object
(since the other object prices cannot decrease in the course of the algorithm). We next note that if
an object receives a bid in m rounds, its price must exceed its initial price by at least me. Thus,
for sufficiently large m, the object will become "expensive" enough to be judged "inferior" to some
object that has not received a bid so far. It follows that there is a limited number of rounds at
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which an object can receive a bid, while there is still some other object that has not yet received
any bid. Therefore, there are two possibilities: either (a) the auction terminates (in a finite number
of rounds) or (b) the auction will continue until all objects receive at least one bid, at which time all
persons will be almost happy, and the auction will terminate. (This argument uses the assumption
that any person can bid for any object but it can be generalized for the case where the set of feasible
person-object pairs is limited, as long as there exists at least one feasible assignment.) Figure 4 shows
how the auction algorithm, based on the bidding increment (8), overcomes the cycling problem of
the example of Fig. 2.
Optimality Properties at Termination
When the auction algorithm terminates, we have an assignment which is almost at equilibrium,
but does this assignment maximize the total benefit? The answer here depends strongly on the size
of c. In a real auction, a prudent bidder would not place an excessively high bid for fear the object
might be won at an unnecessarily high price. Consistent with this intuition, we can show that if e
is small, then the final assignment will be "almost optimal". In particular, we can show that the
total benefit of the final assignment is within ne of being optimal. A simple self-contained proof of
this is given in Appendix A; the idea is that an assignment and a set of prices that are almost at
equilibrium may be viewed as being at equilibrium for a slightly different problem where all benefits
aij are the same as before, except for the n benefits of the assigned pairs which are modified by an
amount no more than c.
Suppose now that the benefits aij are all integer, which is the typical practical case (if aij are
rational numbers, they can be scaled up to integer by multiplication with a suitable common num-
ber). Then, the total benefit of any assignment is integer, so if ne < 1, a complete assignment that
is within ne of being optimal must be optimal. It follows, that if
e< -,
and the benefits aij are all integer, then the assignment obtained upon termination of the auction
algorithm is optimal. [Actually, with a more careful analysis, we can show that for optimality of
the final assignment, it is sufficient that e < 1/(n - 1). This threshold cannot be further improved;
the original paper [Ber79] gives for every n > 2, an example where the auction algorithm terminates
with a nonoptimal assignment when e = 1/(n - 1).]
4. DUALITY AND THE COORDINATE DESCENT INTERPRETATION
Just as the final assignment obtained from the auction algorithm is within ne of being optimal,
it turns out that the final set of prices is within ne of being an optimal solution of a certain dual
problem. As shown in Appendix A, this dual problem is
n n
i Ln d E pj + E1 axiaij? - } - - I (9)
j=l i=1
4. Duality and Coordinate Descent Interpretation
PERSONS OBJECTS
Initially assigned 1 Initial price = 0
to object 1
Initially assigne 2 2 Initial price = 0
to object 2
Here aij = C > O for all (i,j) with i = 1,2,3 and j = 1,2
and aij = 0 for all (i,j) with i = 1,2,3 and j = 3
Initially assigned Initial price = O
to object 3 3
At Start Almost Hap Preferred Bidding
>of Round EObject Pri es Assigned Pairs Almost Happy Bidder Preferredir of Rou n d # ~~Persons Object I crement
1 0, 0, 0 (1,1) (2,2) (3,3) 1, 2 
,F 2 0, E, 0 (1,1) (2,3) (3,2) 1, 3 2 1 2e
3 2e, ,0 (1,2) (2,3) (3,1) 2,3 1 2 2e
4 2e, 3e, 0 (1,2) (2,1) (3,3) 1, 2 3 1 2e
5 4e, 3e, 0 (1,3) (2,1) (3,2) 1,3 2 2 2e
6 .... ....... 
....
Figure 4: Illustration of how the auction algorithm overcomes the cycling problem for the example of Fig. 2,by making the bidding increment at least equal to c. We give one possible sequence of bids and assignmentsgenerated by the auction algorithm, starting with all prices equal to 0. At each round except the last, the person
assigned to object 3 bids for either object 1 or 2, increasing its price by e in the first round and by 2c in each
subsequent round. In the last round, after the prices of 1 and 2 rise at or above C, object 3 receives a bid and
the auction terminates.
Figure 5 shows the sequence of generated object prices for the example of Figs. 2 and 4 in
relation to the contours of the dual cost function of Eq. (9). It can be seen from this figure that
each bid has the effect of setting the price of the object receiving the bid nearly equal (within
c) to the price that minimizes the dual cost with respect to that price with all other prices held
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fixed. This observation can be rigorously established and generalized (we refer the reader to [Ber88]
and [BeT89] for the technical details). Successive minimization of a cost function along single
coordinates is a central feature of coordinate descent and relaxation methods, which are popular for
unconstrained minimization of smooth functions and for solving systems of smooth equations. The
auction algorithm can be interpreted as an approximate coordinate descent method and as such,
it is related to relaxation methods for network flow problems [Ber82], [BeT85], [BeT88], [BeT89],
which also resemble coordinate descent methods. There is a fundamental difference here, however;
the dual cost function is piecewise linear and thus it is not smooth. It is precisely for this reason
that we had to introduce the perturbations implicit in the "almost happiness" or c-complementary
slackness condition (7).
In the auction algorithm presented so far, only one person can bid at each round; this version
of the auction algorithm is known as the one-at-a-time or Gauss-Seidel implementation, in view of
its similarity with Gauss-Seidel relaxation methods for solving systems of equations [OrR70]. An
alternative is to calculate at each round the bids of all unassigned persons simultaneously and to
raise the prices of objects that receive a bid to the highest bid level. This version is known as the
all-at-once or Jacobi implementation, in view of its similarity with Jacobi relaxation methods for
solving systems of equations [OrR70]. It is just as valid as the Gauss-Seidel version although it tends
to terminate a little slower. It is, however, better suited for parallel computation.
5. COMPUTATIONAL ASPECTS - c-SCALING
The auction algorithm exhibits interesting computational behavior and it is essential to under-
stand this behavior in order to implement the algorithm efficiently.
We first note that the amount of work to solve the problem can depend strongly on the value of
e and on the maximum absolute object value
C = max laxi 1. (9)
Basically, for many types of problems, the number of bidding rounds up to termination tends to be
proportional to C/e. This can be seen from the example of Fig. 5, where the number of rounds up
to termination is roughly C/e, starting from zero initial prices.
We note also that there is a dependence on the initial prices; if these prices are "near optimal",
it can be expected that the number of rounds to solve the problem will be relatively small. This can
be seen from the example of Fig. 5; if the initial prices satisfy p, z p3 + C and P2 P p3 + C, it can
be seen that the number of rounds up to termination is quite small.
The preceding observations suggest the idea of c-scaling, which consists of applying the algorithm
several times, starting with a large value of e and successively reducing e up to an ultimate value
which is less than the critical value 1/n. Each application of the algorithm provides good initial
prices for the next application. This is a very common idea in nonlinear programming, encountered
for example, in penalty function methods. An alternative form of scaling, called cost scaling, is
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PERSONS OBJECTS
Initially assigned 1 nitial price = 
to object 1
Initially assigned 2 Initial price = 0
to object 2
Here aij = C > O for all (i,j) with i = 1,2,3 and j = 1,2
and aij = O for all (i,j) with i 1,2,3 and j = 3
Initially assigned Initial price= 
to object 3 3 I
P2
Contours of the
dual function
p1
Figure 5: Illustration of the sequence of prices generated by the auction algorithm for the example of Fig.4, in relation to the contours of the dual function
3 3
Epj + Enmax{aij--pj},
j=1 i=1
[cf. Eq. (9)] viewed as a function of P1 and P2, with p3 held fixed at its initial price of 0.
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based on successively representing the benefits aij with an increasing number of bits, while keeping
c at a constant value.
In practice, it is a good idea to at least consider scaling. For sparse assignment problems, that
is, problems where the set of feasible assignment pairs is severely restricted, scaling seems almost
universally helpful. This was established experimentally at the time of the original proposal of
the auction algorithm. A related (polynomial) computational complexity analysis of the auction
algorithm was given in [BeE88], [BeT89], using some of the earlier ideas of an c-scaling analysis
[Gol87], [GoT87], for a different but related method (the e-relaxation method, to be discussed
shortly).
There is a public domain code, called AUCTION, which implements the auction algorithm and is
available at no cost from the author. Roughly, in this code the integer benefits aij are first multiplied
by n + 1 and the auction algorithm is applied with progressively lower value of c, up to the point
where c becomes 1 or smaller (because aij has been scaled by n + 1, it is sufficient for optimality of
the final assignment to have c < 1). The sequence of c values used is
c(k) = max{1, /k, k = 0,1,...
where A and 0 are parameters set by the user with A > 0 and 0 > 1. (Typical values for sparse
problems are C/5 < A < C/2 and 4 < 0 < 10. For nonsparse problems, sometimes A = 1, which in
effect bypasses c-scaling, works quite well.)
Extensive computational experimentation with the AUCTION code has established that the auc-
tion algorithm is very efficient in practice. For sparse problems, it outperforms substantially its
principal competitors (see [BeC89a] and [BeC89b], which contain extensive computational results).
Furthermore, the factor of superiority increases with the dimension n, indicating a superior practical
computational complexity. For nonsparse problems, the auction algorithm is competitive with its
rivals. The practical performance of the auction algorithm is also supported by theoretical computa-
tional complexity analysis [BeE88], [BeT89], [BeC89b], which gives it a substantial edge over other
popular methods for large and sparse problems.
Figures 6, 7, and 8 give some typical computational results, comparing the AUCTION code
with the code of [JoV87] (abbreviated as JV), the code APS of [CMT88], and the code RELAX-II
developed by P. Tseng and the author [BeT88]. JV is a two-phase method; the first phase is an
extensive initialization procedure based on the relaxation method of [Ber81] and the second phase is
an implementation of the Hungarian method based on the use of sequential shortest paths. APS is
an efficient implementation of the Hungarian method without the use of sequential shortest paths.
RELAX-II is an efficient public domain implementation of the general linear network flow relaxation
method of [Ber82] and [BeT85]. (RELAX-II is, of course, at a disadvantage here because it treats
the assignment problem as a more general network flow problem and ignores much of its special
structure.) Note from Figs. 6-8 that AUCTION is almost uniformly faster than the other codes and
that the factor of superiority increases as the problem becomes more sparse.
There have been also a number of computational studies involving parallel implementation of the
auction algorithm by among others, D. Castanon, L. Hatai, J. Kennington, E. L. Perry, H. Zaki, and
S. Zenios. Collectively, these studies indicate that the speeedup that one can obtain from parallelism
is substantial (in the order of four to ten for sparse problems and considerably larger for nonsparse
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Solution Time (sees on MAC 11)
80
Average number of objects per person = 5
Benefits uniformly distributed in the range [0,1000]
60 JV ./'
APS
40
20
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Number of Persons n
Figure 6: Computational results comparing various codes on a MAC-II on randomly generated problems.
For all test problems, the number of feasible assignment pairs is 5n, where n is the number of persons, and
the benefits aij are integers chosen according to a uniform distribution from the range [0, 1000].
problems, depending on the implementation and the machine used).
6. VARIATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
The auction algorithm can be extended for solution of a number of important linear network flow
problems.
Asymmetric Assignment Problems
A variation of the auction algorithm can be used for asymmetric assignment problems where the
number of objects is larger than the number of persons and there is a requirement that all persons be
assigned to some object. Naturally, the notion of an assignment must now be modified appropriately.
To solve this problem, the auction algorithm need only be modified in the choice of initial conditions.
It is sufficient to require that all initial prices be zero. There is also a similar algorithm for the case
where there is no requirement that all persons be assigned.
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Solution Time (secs on MAC II)
60 - Average number of objects per person = 15
Benefits uniformly dl rlbuted in the range [0,1000]
50
APS
~40 \/ ~ RELAX II
30 / 
20 
10
AUCTION
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Number of Persons n
Figure 7: Computational results comparing various codes on a MAC-II on randomly generated problems.
For all test problems, the number of feasible assignment pairs is 15n, where n is the number of persons, and
the benefits aij are integers chosen according to a uniform distribution from the range [0, 1000].
Parallel and Asynchronous Implementation
It is clear that both the bidding and the assignment phases of the auction algorithm are highly
parallelizable. This is particularly so for the all-at-once (Jacobi) version of the algorithm, where the
bidding and assignment can be carried out simultaneously for all persons and objects simultaneously.
Such an implementation can be termed synchronous. There are also totally asynchronous implemen-
tations of the auction algorithm, which are interesting because they are quite flexible and also tend
to result in faster solution in some types of parallel machines. To understand these implementations,
it is useful to think of a person as an autonomous decision maker that obtains at unpredictable times
information about the prices of the objects. Each person who is not almost happy makes a bid at
arbitrary times on the basis of its current object price information (that may be outdated because
of communication delays). A careful formulation of the totally asynchronous model, and a proof of
its validity is given in [Ber86a], [BeE88], and [BeT89].
Extension to Transportation and Minimum Cost Flow Problems
The auction algorithm has been extended by D. Castanon and the author to solve linear trans-
portation problems [BeC89a]. The basic idea is to convert the transportation problem into an
assignment problem by creating multiple copies of persons (or objects) for each source (or sink
13
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Solution Time (secs on MAC II)
40 Average number of objects per person = 50
Benefits uniformly distributed in the range [0,1000]
30
APS
20
JV
RELAX 11
10
AUCTION
0 I I -I
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
Number of Persons n
Figure 8: Computational results comparing various codes on a MAC-II on randomly generated problems.
For all test problems, the number of feasible assignment pairs is 50n, where n is the number of persons, and
the benefits aij are integers chosen according to a uniform distribution from the range [0, 1000].
respectively), and then to modify the auction algorithm to take advantage of the presence of the
multiple copies. Computational results given in [BeC89a] with a code called TRANSAUCTION,
show that this auction algorithm is considerably faster than its chief competitors for important
classes of transportation problems. Generally these problems are characterized by two properties,
which we call homogeneity and asymmetry. A homogeneous problem is one for which there are only
few levels of supply and demand. An asymmetric problem is one for which the number of sources
is much larger than the number of sinks. For other types of transportation problems, the auction
algorithm is outperformed by, for example, the relaxation code RELAX-II.
We finally note that there are extensions of the auction algorithm for linear minimum cost flow
(transhipment) problems. The first such extension is the c-relaration method, originally given in
[Ber86a], and [Ber86b] (see [BeT89] for a detailed description of this method). A subsequent exten-
sion is the network auction algorithm of [BeC89b], which is typically more efficient in practice than
the c-relaxation method. These methods have interesting theoretical properties and like the auction
algorithm, are well suited for parallelization. However, for general transhipment problems, their
practical performance has yet to match the one of relaxation methods (e.g. the RELAX-II code);
this is an area where further research may reverse currently prevailing opinion.
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The auction algorithm is an intuitive method based on new and interesting computational ideas.
Its performance on serial machines is excellent and it is also well suited for implementation in parallel
machines, in both a synchronous and an asynchronous mode. Auction-like algorithms for network
flow problems more general than assignment have been developed only recently. Much remains to
be done to properly extend them and to realize their full potential.
To foster research in the network optimization area, the codes AUCTION, TRANSAUCTION,
and RELAX-II have been placed in the public domain and are available from the author at no cost.
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APPENDIX A: RELATION OF EQUILIBRIA WITH PRIMAL AND DUAL OPTIMALITY
Let us fix c > 0. In this appendix, we show that given an assignment {(i, ji) I i = 1,..., n} and
a set of prices {pj I j = 1,..., n}, which are almost at equilibrium (if e > 0) or at equilibrium (if
e = 0), then the assignment is within ne of maximizing the total benefit, and is optimal if c = 0.
Furthermore, the set of prices is within ne of minimizing a certain dual cost function.
Let e > 0. We first note that the total benefit of any assignment {(i, ki) I i = 1,..., n} satisfies
n n n
E aiki < E pj + E max{aij - pj},
i=l j=l i=1
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for any set of prices {pj I j = 1,..., n}, since the second term of the right-hand side is no less than
n
i=l
while the first term is equal to ''=l Pk,. Therefore,
A* < D*,
where A* is the optimal total assignment benefit
A* max aik
ki*k, if i;m i=l
and
(n n
D* = min pj + E m aij - pj} 
Pj
j= 1 ,...,n j i
On the other hand, since all persons are almost happy with the given assignment {(i, ji) j i =
1,..., n} and set of prices {ij I j = ,..., n),}, we have
max {aij -yj} - c < aij, -p j,,j=l ...,n
and by adding this relation over all i, we see that
D*<--, i + max{aij- })j < i+nc< A* + ne.
Since we showed earlier that A* < D*, it follows that the total assignment benefit En1 aiji is within
ne of the optimal value A*.
Note that the function
n n
pij + 5:max{aij -pj}
j=l i=l
appearing in the definition of D*, may be viewed as a dual function of the price variables pj, and its
minimization may be viewed as a dual problem in the standard linear programming duality context;
see [Ber88], [BeT89], [Dan62], and [PaS82]. It is seen from the preceding analysis, that the prices pj
attain within ne the dual optimal value D*.
If we let e = 0 in the preceding argument, we see that A* = D*, and that an assignment and
a set of prices that are at equilibrium, maximize the total benefit and minimize the dual function,
respectively.
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